zlacker

>>jakels+(OP)
No firewall! Wow that's brave. Hetzner will let you configure one that runs outside of the box so you might want to add that too, as part of your defense in depth - that will cover you if you make a mistake with ufw. Personally I keep SSH firewalled only to my home address in this way; if I'm out and about and need access, I can just log into Hetzner's website and change it temporarily.

>>danpar+Gj
Firewalls in the majority of cases don't get you much. Yes it's a last line of defense if you do something really stupid and don't even know where or what you configure your services to listen on, but if you don't the difference between running firewalls and not is minuscule.

There are way more important things like actually knowing that you are running software with widely known RCE that don't even use established mechanisms to sandbox themselves it seems.

The way the author describes docker being the savior appears to be sheer luck.

>>tete+7u
The author mentioned they had other services exposed to the internet (Postgres, RabbitMQ) which increases their attack surface area. There may be vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in those services for example.

Good security is layered.

>>danpar+7U
But if they have to be exposed then a firewall won't help, and if they don't have to be exposed to the internet then a firewall isn't needed either, just configure them not to listen on non-local interfaces.

>>seszet+cX
This sounds like an extremely effective foot gun.

Just use a firewall.

>>spoace+l21
I'm not sure what you mean, what sounds dangerous to me is not caring about what services are listening to on a server.

The firewall is there as a safeguard in case a service is temporarily misconfigured, it should certainly not be the only thing standing between your services and the internet.