zlacker

>>kotaKa+(OP)
I predict Windows will end up going this route before Google backtracks on it.

This is the future; partially fuelled by malware, partially fuelled by the desire for platform control, and partially fuelled by government regulation.

>>wvenab+0I
As an example of government regulation driving this change, see [1].

This regulation of NSW, Australia considers rooted devices with extra non-Google/non-Apple approved security features such as a duress/wipe PIN (a standard feature of GrapheneOS[2]) as a "dedicated encrypted criminal communication device". How the device is being used doesn't matter. It's how it _could_ be used.

[1] https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190...

[2] https://grapheneos.org/features#duress

>>dhx+oU
This is uncanny and worryingly specific, and I'm not a lawyer, but if you're not already under suspicion of being a criminal, then installing graphene doesn't match this definition I think

>>meltyn+q11
"This regulation will only apply to people who are already criminals" is a line that has never held

>>bandra+141
I mean, you don't really have to speculate about what this is for, it's for an authority providing for lawful search, it seems pretty well-scoped, and similar to any old search warrant, which is not a new thing, really https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/deccd...

Basically, they're not really setting up for a blanket ban on personal security features, that interpretation is obviously catastrophizing. Not that there aren't hamfisted laws somewhere like this, but NSWs implementation seems OK I guess