zlacker

>>kotaKa+(OP)
I predict Windows will end up going this route before Google backtracks on it.

This is the future; partially fuelled by malware, partially fuelled by the desire for platform control, and partially fuelled by government regulation.

>>wvenab+0I
As an example of government regulation driving this change, see [1].

This regulation of NSW, Australia considers rooted devices with extra non-Google/non-Apple approved security features such as a duress/wipe PIN (a standard feature of GrapheneOS[2]) as a "dedicated encrypted criminal communication device". How the device is being used doesn't matter. It's how it _could_ be used.

[1] https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190...

[2] https://grapheneos.org/features#duress

>>dhx+oU
This is uncanny and worryingly specific, and I'm not a lawyer, but if you're not already under suspicion of being a criminal, then installing graphene doesn't match this definition I think

>>meltyn+q11
"This regulation will only apply to people who are already criminals" is a line that has never held

>>bandra+141
Suspect, they wrote, and that happens all the time. If you go into a store on the way home from work, and 99 days this works fine but the 100th day they want to look in your bag, but you can't show them confidential drawings of the Google Pixel 14 Max that you carry as part of your work, now they'll think you really did steal something and you went from no suspicion (spot check) to definitely a suspect and new things start to apply to you, e.g. if you leave without resolving the suspicion the police might have grounds to enter your house or search you when you walk out next time. The suspicion is based on being a suspect, not on any actual evidence (nobody saw you put anything in your bag)