zlacker

>>kotaKa+(OP)
I predict Windows will end up going this route before Google backtracks on it.

This is the future; partially fuelled by malware, partially fuelled by the desire for platform control, and partially fuelled by government regulation.

>>wvenab+0I
As an example of government regulation driving this change, see [1].

This regulation of NSW, Australia considers rooted devices with extra non-Google/non-Apple approved security features such as a duress/wipe PIN (a standard feature of GrapheneOS[2]) as a "dedicated encrypted criminal communication device". How the device is being used doesn't matter. It's how it _could_ be used.

[1] https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190...

[2] https://grapheneos.org/features#duress

>>dhx+oU
I don't know that it's that simple. Further down that section (1920) in reference [1] reads

"(3) A dedicated encrypted criminal communication device does not include-- (a) a device if-- (i) the device has been designed, modified or equipped with software or security features, and (ii) a reasonable person would consider the software or security features have been applied for a primary purpose other than facilitating communication between persons involved in criminal activity to defeat law enforcement detection,"

It's not automatic: depending on what a reasonable person thinks and the definition of criminal activity.

>>femto+kV
I mean, in my country, it's increasingly unclear to me whether things like "loudly criticizing the executive branch" are now considered criminal. Recent executive branch statements on this issue seem to indicate that they may consider some critics criminal just for being critics. But it's hard to be sure. And so far, every critic they've threatened to arrest has also been accused of committing other crimes.

So "the government only considers a duress PIN illegal if it is used to facilitate crime" seems like a potentially tricky standard to apply.