zlacker

>>kotaKa+(OP)
I predict Windows will end up going this route before Google backtracks on it.

This is the future; partially fuelled by malware, partially fuelled by the desire for platform control, and partially fuelled by government regulation.

>>wvenab+0I
As an example of government regulation driving this change, see [1].

This regulation of NSW, Australia considers rooted devices with extra non-Google/non-Apple approved security features such as a duress/wipe PIN (a standard feature of GrapheneOS[2]) as a "dedicated encrypted criminal communication device". How the device is being used doesn't matter. It's how it _could_ be used.

[1] https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190...

[2] https://grapheneos.org/features#duress

>>dhx+oU
I don't know that it's that simple. Further down that section (1920) in reference [1] reads

"(3) A dedicated encrypted criminal communication device does not include-- (a) a device if-- (i) the device has been designed, modified or equipped with software or security features, and (ii) a reasonable person would consider the software or security features have been applied for a primary purpose other than facilitating communication between persons involved in criminal activity to defeat law enforcement detection,"

It's not automatic: depending on what a reasonable person thinks and the definition of criminal activity.