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[return to "Graphene OS: a security-enhanced Android build"]
1. jrexil+LE[view] [source] 2025-07-25 03:17:46
>>madars+(OP)
I just installed Graphene on a new pixel. I've only used it for two days, but I got that same feeling of "finding buried treasure in your backyard" I got when I first installed Linux in 1999. I can't believe this amazing software is free in all senses of the word. It is a TON of work and they got so much right. The security and usability settings give all the grainular control I've known was possible and wanted for a long time.

I see some core team on this thread, so just wanted to say THANK YOU! Awesome job! Keep fighting for the users!

I'm totally the wrong person to offer recommendations on mobile, but so far it works very well for me, but then, I use almost no third party apps, and none of them are Play store only. My only complaint is the hardware (outside of their control).

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2. csmatt+h61[view] [source] 2025-07-25 08:23:31
>>jrexil+LE
I got it installed last weekend, really powerful mobile OS.

I did do about three weeks of research, as I worried that maybe a number of apps wouldn't run on it or needed some form of deep attestation. Didn't find much, OpsGenie and other work apps are happy with the GOS level of attestation provided.

Great to have Google kicked off the phone. So nice to shut off the network permission for any apps that only require an internet connection to serve ads.

One tip from me, if you came from stock Pixel: You can download the default Pixel sounds and set them up like it was. Have a look for "Your New Adventure" online, the message sound is "Eureka".

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3. exe34+T81[view] [source] 2025-07-25 08:53:08
>>csmatt+h61
> So nice to shut off the network permission for any apps that only require an internet connection to serve ads.

For those of us who aren't ready to cut the umbilical cord to the mothership, you can also root/firewall on normal android to stop this. In fact I choose to not be able to use banking apps in order to cut out the crappy ads.

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4. strcat+pb2[view] [source] 2025-07-25 16:34:28
>>exe34+T81
> For those of us who aren't ready to cut the umbilical cord to the mothership

You can use Google apps and apps depending on them on GrapheneOS via sandboxed Google Play. The vast majority of Android apps can be used. You don't need to stop using Google apps/services or other mainstream apps to use GrapheneOS. It's likely nearly all the apps you use or even all of them work on GrapheneOS. There's a per-app exploit protection compatibility mode toggle (and finer-grained toggles) to work around buggy apps with memory corruption bugs. We avoid turning on features breaking non-buggy apps by default and hardware memory tagging is temporarily opt-in for user installed apps not marked as compatible due to how many memory corruption bugs it finds.

A small number of apps are unavailable due to checking for a Google certified device/OS via the Play Integrity API. These are mostly banking apps, but most banking apps do work on GrapheneOS. There are tap-to-pay implementations which can be used on GrapheneOS in the UK and European Economic Area. Several banking apps recently explicitly added support for GrapheneOS via hardware-based attestation as an alternative to the Play Integrity API. We're pushing for more apps to do this and for regulation disallowing Google from providing an API to app developers for enforcing devices licensing Google Mobile Services. Play Integrity API often portrayed as a security feature but Google chooses not to enforce a security patch level. They're permitting devices with years of missing important privacy and security patches but not a much more private and secure OS. Only their strong integrity level has a patch level check, but the check is only done for recent Android versions and only requires they aren't more than 12 months behind on patches which serves no real purpose.

> you can also root/firewall on normal android

This is different from our Network permission which not only blocks direct access but also indirect access via APIs requiring Android's low-level INTERNET permission. Our Network permission also pretends the network is down through many of the APIs. For example, scheduled jobs set to depend on internet access won't run.

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