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[return to "Graphene OS: a security-enhanced Android build"]
1. lrvick+r11[view] [source] 2025-07-25 07:38:02
>>madars+(OP)
GrapheneOS (like all modern AOSP based ROMS) can literally not function with just the open source code. It requires hundreds of binary blobs from the vendor partition of a stock Android ROM, many of which have root access and have not been audited by anyone, including Google, who often lacks source code for them.

Beyond that, the GraheneOS team still controls a single signing keychain for all phones in the wild, which we have to assume is still controlled by Daniel Micay (strcat) as it has not rotated as far as I can tell since he mostly stepped away from public view.

He is without question a brilliant security engineer, but we can't ignore his very public Terry-Davis-esqe history of mental illness. Making -anyone- a single point of failure for a ROM frequently recommended for journalists and dissidents is a bad plan, and especially not someone very prone to believing wild conspiracy theories.

I can't recommend GrapheneOS for any high risk use cases until:

1. they are able to find a device they can run 100% open source code on with no binary blobs

2. The ROM can be full source bootstrapped to mitigate trusting trust attacks.

3. The ROM builds 100% deterministically and is reproduced and signed by multiple team members publicly

4. Threshold signing or a quorum managed enclave issues the final signature only if multiple team members give it signed approvals of a hash to sign.

Until at least those points are covered, the centralized trust model of GrapheneOS is a liability and the central keyholder is at high risk of being targeted for manipulation or coercion.

Honestly there is no good solution to these problems right now, and as a security and privacy researcher my best advice today to potentially targeted individuals is don't carry a phone at all, or if you must carry one, keep it in airplane mode whenever possible and do not do anything sensitive on it. Consider QubesOS or AirgapOS for such things.

If you are fine with centralized control of a phone, and fine with binary blobs controlled by random corpos having God access to your device, but would prefer to eliminate as much proprietary corpotech bullshit as possible, then I would suggest considering CalyxOS which is at least run by a former LineageOS maintainer with a great reputation.

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2. gf000+Wv1[view] [source] 2025-07-25 12:45:36
>>lrvick+r11
> my best advice today to potentially targeted individuals is don't carry a phone at alil

Lol. I hope you like working with geese, but be careful, they can't be trusted!

Also, you are pretty much factually wrong on a bunch of items on your list. GrapheneOS still has room for improvement of course, but they are very ahead of anything else on every aspect. And where you are not factually wrong, you are just unrealistic. There is no 100% open-source hardware, period. This is complete "what color you want your dragon to be" category.

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3. lrvick+VO1[view] [source] 2025-07-25 14:41:55
>>gf000+Wv1
> Lol. I hope you like working with geese, but be careful, they can't be trusted!

Geese? That is offensive. I raise chickens.

I also run a successful tech company, and have a full EE lab, several full server racks, and more tech in my home than anyone I have ever met.

Phones are completely optional in modern society. We have just convinced ourselves we need them because doom scrolling and constant notifications are addictive.

Print your boarding pass, ask for paper menus, pay with cash, and arrange times and places to meet people and then actually be there on time. The rare times you really need to do online work on the go, bring an actual computer with a real keyboard. Free wifi is everywhere.

Works just fine, and as a bonus your time away from home becomes mostly invisible to marketing firms.

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