zlacker

>>fsflov+(OP)
The sideloading restriction is easily solved by installing GrapheneOS, which has all the security benefits of Google's Android on Pixel.

In parallel, Google has rolled out its Play Integrity API, which allows developers to limit app functionality when sideloaded, effectively pushing users to install apps only through the Google Play Store.

The issue is even bigger. Even when using Play Store on GrapheneOS with a locked bootloader (which is the recommended configuration by the GrapheneOS project), Google refuses to let apps use the hardware attestation support in the Play Integrity API [1], which blocks certain banking apps, Google Wallet, etc.

It's insane that Google lets Android vendors that have a lot of dubious security practices (months-late security updates, etc.) pass, while an OS that implements more security mitigations than PixelOS and is sometimes faster than Google rolling out security updates is excluded.

The move, developed in partnership with Singapore’s Cyber Security Agency, is designed to prevent fraud and malware-enabled scams.

Time to block the Facebook/Instagram apps then, given https://localmess.github.io ?

[1] https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112878070618462132

>>microt+d6
A huge problem with Graphene is the incredibly small number of supported devices. We need something that isn't as reliant on specific hardware, and while that would mean some security features are not supported it would still be better than most other options by far.

>>JCatth+Ab
Unfortunately, Google's Pixel devices have been the only ones with hardware that meets all of the project's stringent security requirements, including a secure hardware enclave and multiyear commitments from the vendor to firmware security updates (I think 7 years of updates now for the newest Pixels). Those seem to be the big two things that no other Android vendor achieves together.

The GrapheneOS devs are serious about security, probably more focused on it than 99% of end users. That they manage to release a project with the high level of usability that GrapheneOS achieves is impressive, even if it isn't as convenient to the end user as stock Android. Ultimately, nothing will ever be as convenient to the end user as stock Android or iOS, but that's not the point of the project.

>>sfRatt+7K
> Unfortunately, Google's Pixel devices have been the only ones with hardware that meets all of the project's stringent security requirements, including a secure hardware enclave

That's my point, though. The projects security requirements don't need to be that stringent. By all means, take advantage of the hardware security on devices that offer it like pixel, but even on devices without that hardware security it would still be the most secure Android based OS available, and orders of magnitudes more people would benefit from having access to that.