Which of course they are going to try to brush it all away. Better than admitting that this problem very much still exists and isn’t going away anytime soon.
The section about hallucinations is deeply relevant.
Namely, Claude sometimes provides a plausible but incorrect chain-of-thought reasoning when its “true” computational path isn’t available. The model genuinely believes it’s giving a correct reasoning chain, but the interpretability microscope reveals it is constructing symbolic arguments backward from a conclusion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Bullshit
This empirically confirms the “theory of bullshit” as a category distinct from lying. It suggests that “truth” emerges secondarily to symbolic coherence and plausibility.
This means knowledge itself is fundamentally symbolic-social, not merely correspondence to external fact.
Knowledge emerges from symbolic coherence, linguistic agreement, and social plausibility rather than purely from logical coherence or factual correctness.
This just seems like a redefinition of the word "knowledge" different from how it's commonly used. When most people say "knowledge" they mean beliefs that are also factually correct.
> Smith [...] has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford". Smith
> therefore (justifiably) concludes [...] that "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown
> is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no information whatsoever about
> the location of Brown. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer
> coincidence, Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that
> was true and justified, but not knowledge.
> Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we
> think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the
> spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we
> had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were
> just lucky.