Which of course they are going to try to brush it all away. Better than admitting that this problem very much still exists and isn’t going away anytime soon.
The section about hallucinations is deeply relevant.
Namely, Claude sometimes provides a plausible but incorrect chain-of-thought reasoning when its “true” computational path isn’t available. The model genuinely believes it’s giving a correct reasoning chain, but the interpretability microscope reveals it is constructing symbolic arguments backward from a conclusion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Bullshit
This empirically confirms the “theory of bullshit” as a category distinct from lying. It suggests that “truth” emerges secondarily to symbolic coherence and plausibility.
This means knowledge itself is fundamentally symbolic-social, not merely correspondence to external fact.
Knowledge emerges from symbolic coherence, linguistic agreement, and social plausibility rather than purely from logical coherence or factual correctness.
Recognizing the relevance of coherence and plausibility does not need to imply that other aspects are any less relevant. Redefining truth merely because coherence is important and sometimes misinterpreted is not at all reasonable.
Logically, a falsehood can validly be derived from assumptions when those assumptions are false. That simple reasoning step alone is sufficient to explain how a coherent-looking reasoning chain can result in incorrect conclusions. Also, there are other ways a coherent-looking reasoning chain can fail. What you're saying is just not a convincing argument that we need to redefine what truth is.