zlacker

>>pabs3+(OP)
While none of that applies to F-Droids primary use case (the primary F-Droid repo builds all apps from source itself), it nonetheless looks like they failed to correctly handle the issue.

The only reason this didn't turn into a disaster was pure luck.

>>kuschk+X8
The primary F-droid repo also hosts the app developer builds in case of reproducible builds, where F-droid will first build from source and then compare it with the dev's build. If its identical, it uses the dev build in the repo and if its not, the build fails.

The use of AllowedAPKSigningKeys afaik is to compare that key with the key used for signing the dev build. If its not the same, the dev build is rejected.

From what I've understood from this POC, its possible to bypass this signature check. The only exploit I can think of with this bypass is that someone who gets access to the developer's release channel can host their own signed apk, which will either get rejected by Android in case of update (signature mismatch) or gets installed in case of first install. But in either case, its still the same reproducible build, only the signature is different.

>>Futuri+Jt
> The only exploit I can think of with this bypass is that someone who gets access to the developer's release channel can host their own signed apk, which [...] gets installed in case of first install.

That still enables a supply chain attack, which should not be dismissed - virtually all modern targeted attacks involve some complex chain of exploits; a sufficiently motivated attacker will use this.

>>rollca+Uc1
You missed the later part of the quote:

>But in either case, its still the same reproducible build, only the signature is different.

That means the attacker still has to compromise the source repo. If they don't and try to upload a backdoored apk, that would cause a mismatch with the reproducible build and be rejected. If you can compromise the source repo, you're already screwed regardless. Apk signature checks can't protect you against that.

>>gruez+zh1
In a previous post you said that - in case of matching builds - the dev's version is used. Why is the "dev's" version relevant? And assuming I'm correct that it isn't. What is the added benefit vs. just building from source (from a known good state, e.g. by a blessed git hash)?

>>hnacco+Yu1
Android will block any update to an existing app that wasn't signed with the same signature. The benefit of using the developer's signature (even if the app is built by F-Droid) is that the F-Droid release of the app is not treated as a "different app" by the Android OS, and thus it can be updated by other app stores or through direct APK releases from the developer. If the user chooses to stop using F-Droid in the future, they can still receive updates through other means without uninstalling and reinstalling the app.

It also allows the user to place a little less trust on F-Droid because the developer, as well as F-Droid, must confirm any release before it can be distributed. (Now that I think of it, that probably creates an issue where if malware somehow slips in, F-Droid has no power to remove it via an automatic update. Perhaps they should have a malware response or notification system?)

More: https://f-droid.org/2023/09/03/reproducible-builds-signing-k...