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1. eadmun+ji1[view] [source] 2024-12-27 13:06:48
>>caust1+(OP)
The very first sentence is:

> Passwords are rubbish.

Hard, hard disagree. They’re really not. Password reuse is rubbish. Passwords human beings can remember are rubbish. But a secure password — i.e., a random value with 128 bits of entropy (such as a random 28-letter string) known only to the two parties to an authentication — is not rubbish.

There is the very minimum amount of protocol necessary: one party asks for it; the other party provides it.

The end user can pick his own software to manage his passwords, or none at all (a piece of paper in a wallet is remarkably secure) and the relying party to has no ability to approve or disapprove.

I do agree that WebAuthn offers very real improvements over passwords (principally due to no longer being a shared secret), but it makes things worse for the users in a few ways. For one, the ability of relying parties to blacklist or whitelist authenticators tramples on the user’s freedom to use the software he wants. Attestation keys and enterprise attestation are user-hostile: users and servers are no longer equal parties.

And finally, the user experience of passkeys with, say, a phone-based authenticator is miserable: one must interrupt one’s computer usage, pick up the phone, unlock the phone, open the notification and unlock the app, then put the phone down.

All in all, while WebAuthn does offer real advantages, I am concerned by how it reduces users to mere consumers, digital serfs to their technological overlords.

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2. hahn-k+Sj1[view] [source] 2024-12-27 13:26:03
>>eadmun+ji1
The assumption that only one party knows the password is not always (maybe even usually) incorrect. Plenty of sites store the password in plain text or hash on the server side. Meaning it's very possible for both parties to know it.
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