The solution is to allow local interfaces (matter, HTTP, etc) but most company cybersecurity teams just freak out at this.
Oh, and the reason we don't have a full time team managing HA is like I said.. addressable market versus FAANG/Samsung.
It takes a full time person (persons) to manage Alexa, Google, Samsung, etc.
I've long advocated a local HTTP interface for our products, but usually a losing battle.
A lot of the worst IoT vulnerabilities in the past have been due to exactly that. 'Local' unfortunately isn't something decided at design time, it's decided when someone connects it to a network. Most people plugging these devices in don't have any clue how to simultaneously secure them and connect them to the internet, so they often end up directly on the internet with default credentials or with outdated vulnerable software and a port open. That's the biggest reason all of the major players now just close all inbound ports and reach outbound to a cloud service. It checks both boxes of usability and network security with even the most misguided user.
Yes, this arrangement sucks for people who know better. But we aren't the people in the user stories.
It's obviously connected to the public internet when it talks to cloud servers, and that's somehow (claimed to be) secure.
Comparing a good cloud API with a poorly designed local API is a false dichotomy. Would you set up your cloud servers with default credentials of admin:admin?
Have a hidden physical switch that toggles local control, and require a physical button press to (re-)generate secure credentials. Have the user upload TLS certificates (non-optional), then hand over the credentials over a secure connection. There, the security of local API should now be up to par with the cloud connection.