zlacker

>>_delir+(OP)
> The city’s entire five-officer police force and two sheriff’s deputies took “everything we have,” Meyer said, and it wasn’t clear how the newspaper staff would take the weekly publication to press Tuesday night.

Two things occur to me about this story, exposed in this quote, that I often think when seeing stories of this nature:

1. Many businesses that rely on computers don't have a disaster recovery plan, and thus, can't spin up again for a while, sometimes at all.

2. Good security (i.e. enough to frustrate aggressive criminal gangs, like the police) is often not in place, for a number of understandable reasons, but they also tend to include less understandable ones (as in (1)).

People like our good selves, the readers of HN, might think about how we can offer our services a bit more widely to help some of the smaller fish out there stand up to bullying and attacks.

>>brigan+n8
Wouldn't the Disaster Recovery/backup equipment also be confiscated by the police?

>>amoshi+Fa
The 1 in 3-2-1 would ensure you have a copy offsite as well.

https://www.uschamber.com/co/run/technology/3-2-1-backup-rul...

>>shawnc+2b
How far offsite? Like, across the street? In another town? Out of state?

Does a small-town newspaper expect to be raided by law enforcement and build a disaster recovery plan around that, or a tornado?

They don't call it "The Long Arm of the Law" for no reason.

>>NoZebr+1c
I recommend to parties I work with that are at risk from these sorts of events to keep their BCDR (business continuity disaster recovery) data corpus at risk in European datacenters owned by European companies. Can be as simple as rsyncs or blob storage backups, or active infra always running, depending on budget and organizational needs and maturity.