zlacker

>>mikece+(OP)
So they generated training data from one laptop and microphone then generated test data with the exact same laptop and microphone in the same setup, possibly one person pressing the keys too. For the Zoom model they trained a new model with data gathered from Zoom. They call it a practical side channel attack but they didnt do anything to see if this approach could generalize at all

>>lispis+Pq
Seems simple to defend - use a password manager.

>>moonch+gO
until you have to type your password to unlock it

>>cmod+lx1
High security safe locks have had protection against this for a long time: you press up/down arrows to move from a random starting digit to the correct digit.

On screen pin entry with jumbled number mappings does the same thing. It also makes the inter-stroke delay rather independent of position, because the brain has to search the screen (although repeated digits and previously occuring digits are quicker, which is why some jumble at every keystroke).

Keyboards with OLED keys (like the Apple Touchbar or the Optimus[1]) might also work.

[1] https://www.artlebedev.com/optimus/popularis/