zlacker

[return to "Apple already shipped attestation on the web, and we barely noticed"]
1. toyg+Za[view] [source] 2023-07-25 14:54:02
>>pimter+(OP)
This might be where the internet really gets forked, as it's been predicted over and over since the '90s.

On one side, we'll have a "clean", authority-sanctioned "corpweb", where everyone is ID'ed to the wazoo; on the other, a more casual "greynet" galaxy of porn and decentralized communities will likely emerge, once all tinkerers get pushed out of corpnet. It could be an interesting opportunity to reboot a few long-lost dreams.

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2. TheNew+Ki[view] [source] 2023-07-25 15:22:17
>>toyg+Za
The problem I have with this web attestation concept generally is that I really want it _inside_ my shiny SSO-everywhere-Zero-Trust-at-the-edge-mTLS-everywhere business network.

I also kind of want it in the public-cloud-meets-private-use home environment (that is, my Cloudflare Access tunnels and MS365 business tenant I use for private stuff).

I don’t want it to touch my personal browsing experience or in any way involved in my personal-use browser environments.

These are effectively opposed desires at this point, and it’s a cat-out-of-the-bag technology.

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3. Mayeul+Nk[view] [source] 2023-07-25 15:31:16
>>TheNew+Ki
Are you sure you don't just want client certs?

I can also imagine an IPv7 with ephemeral addresses based on private keys (like on yggdrasil), and a way for the browser to remember keys if wanted by the user. Authenticate sessions with the "IP address".

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4. mschus+Hm[view] [source] 2023-07-25 15:37:56
>>Mayeul+Nk
Client certs don't guarantee that there is not a rootkit running in kernel space sniffing session tokens, other credentials or data in general from user-space memory.

Attestation does a reasonably well job at that, as you now need a kernel or bootloader exploit.

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5. saurik+7y[view] [source] 2023-07-25 16:13:58
>>mschus+Hm
A "rootkit in kernel space" already requires a kernel exploit, unless what you are really up in arms about is a lack of a verified boot chain (which absolutely does not require remote attestation).
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6. mschus+6I[view] [source] 2023-07-25 16:44:57
>>saurik+7y
> A "rootkit in kernel space" already requires a kernel exploit

On desktop? Nope, which is the point. Placing a piece of malware is easy without a kernel exploit. On standard Linux distributions that do not use dm-verity and friends, local root is enough - modify the kernel image or initrd in /boot, and you can do whatever you want with very few ways for a system administrator to detect it upon the next boot. The challenge more is getting local root in the first place, especially as a lot of systems now use selinux or at least have daemons drop privileges.

Windows is a bit harder since Windows refuses to load unsigned drivers since the Win7 x64 days (x86 IIRC didn't mandate the checks), but that's not as much of a hurdle as most think - just look at the boatload of cases where someone managed to steal (or acquire legitimately) a signing certificate to ship malware. Getting local root here is probably the easiest of all three OSes IMO, given the absurd amount of update helpers and other bloatware that got caught allowing privilege escalation regularly.

The hardest IMO/E is macOS, where you have to manually boot to recovery to deactivate SIP and they've been phasing out kexts pretty much already, and you get a crapton of very strong warnings if you mess around with them - you have to manually load them.

With attestation and code-signing done right, it's all but impossible to get your code running in kernel space on Linux and macOS without a kernel exploit, the achilles heel will always be who gets signing certificates that allow loading a module.

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