zlacker

>>pimter+(OP)
But signing necessarily is happening on the user's device... what is to stop brave/etc from also signing their outgoing requests with the same key your local Chrome install is using? On a mobile device I can see how this would work but how would this ever work on (non-apple) PCs without exposing the key to anyone willing to poke around a bit?

>>sam0x1+h5
I think the idea is, there is a chain of trust from a TPM (So you don't have access to the private key, ever) through the bootloader, OS kernel, Windows Update, and vendor-blessed web browser, to the server.

So Brave would fail when Windows says, "hm, your hash doesn't match any recent Edge version, so you don't get to issue a key signing request to the TPM."

Or it will allow the request but when it arrives at the server as "Windows, non-Edge browser" they'll hit you with the endless CAPTCHAs or just boot you out as a hacker.

It's not the web I grew up in.