If you are shown a product ad whilst browsing searchengine.example and then later look up the product at reviews.example, then end up making a purchase at shop.example, your Mozilla browser will send all of these events to one or more aggregation services that allows shop.example to understand (at least in aggregate, assuming you trust the cartels running the aggregation services) that you were exposed to their product at searchengine.example and further exposed to their product at reviews.example.
Where previously an ad tech company was ultimately able to track users based on source IP address (even if cookies had been disabled by a user), IPA now allows these companies to track users across multiple IP addresses, and regardless of the user's cookie settings, via a unique tracking identifier. It is also proposed that the operating system provides the unique tracking identifier which can then be used by all applications or browsers on a device, allowing different devices behind a single IP address to be distinguished.
Additionally, AntiFraudCG proposals such as WEI focus on benefits they provide to PATCG proposals. For example, a Googler with historical interest in minimising inflated view counts on YouTube[4] (a benefit to YouTube's advertisers) wrote earlier this year a proposal to AntiFraudCG including:
"By transmitting signals of legitimacy from the device’s platform, such as if the device is emulated or rooted, publishers and their technology partners could use this information in part to determine if traffic is invalid. They could then choose appropriate actions like flagging advertising actions as suspicious"[5]
[2] https://github.com/antifraudcg
[3] https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/mission/
[4] https://security.googleblog.com/2014/02/keeping-youtube-view...