zlacker

>>gjsman+(OP)
I'm completely missing how his example of a Word document that can only be opened by approved users on approved hardware within the corporation is supposed to be a bad thing.

Honestly, that sounds pretty fantastic. I've been using 3rd party tools/extensions to do this sort of thing in corporate and government environments for years, but having the attestation go all the way down to the hardware level is a big value-add, especially with so much ransomware/spyware/extortion/espionage going on these days.

Can someone please explain to me how the author might see this level of security as a bad thing?

>>Gh0stR+eg
It doesn't protect from malicious document leakage: you can still take screenshots or photographs or use a plain txt file. For unintentional leakage, MSIP already does what you are saying this just bakes into hardware where patching/fixes are harder than the cloud