zlacker

>>gjsman+(OP)
I'm completely missing how his example of a Word document that can only be opened by approved users on approved hardware within the corporation is supposed to be a bad thing.

Honestly, that sounds pretty fantastic. I've been using 3rd party tools/extensions to do this sort of thing in corporate and government environments for years, but having the attestation go all the way down to the hardware level is a big value-add, especially with so much ransomware/spyware/extortion/espionage going on these days.

Can someone please explain to me how the author might see this level of security as a bad thing?

>>Gh0stR+eg
Because that doesn't work. 2h before someone complains to IT that he cannot write/read/delete said Word document. Then management says X indeed needs access. Now you have created a maintenance nightmare sourced in rather weird security requirements.

Could as well gouge out the eyes of everyone not having a read permission on said document. There are 1001 solution to solve such problems. And as a gigantic bonus it doesn't have to be bound to hardware! User permission management is much easier.