zlacker

>>gjsman+(OP)
I'm completely missing how his example of a Word document that can only be opened by approved users on approved hardware within the corporation is supposed to be a bad thing.

Honestly, that sounds pretty fantastic. I've been using 3rd party tools/extensions to do this sort of thing in corporate and government environments for years, but having the attestation go all the way down to the hardware level is a big value-add, especially with so much ransomware/spyware/extortion/espionage going on these days.

Can someone please explain to me how the author might see this level of security as a bad thing?

>>Gh0stR+eg
The way I see it: Whatever happens, the system will get abused, and so, I weigh the potential abuses along with the potential benefits. With remote attestation, you put a lot of control in the hands whoever controls the "remote", making the situation very asymmetrical, and so, ripe for centralized abuse. For example, with centralized trust systems, a leak of the signing keys are devastating for the system. For an example, see the DVD key leak:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AACS_encryption_key_controvers...