zlacker

>>EthanH+(OP)
This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

>>static+ua
I think 3. is very harmful for actual, real-world use of Free Software. If only specific builds of software that are on a vendor-sanctioned allowlist, governed by the signature of a "trusted" party to grant them entry to said list, can meaningfully access networked services, all those who compile their own artifacts (even from completely identical source code) will be excluded from accessing that remote side/service.

Banks and media corporations are doing it today by requiring a vendor-sanctioned Android build/firmware image, attested and allowlisted by Google's SafetyNet (https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/a...), and it will only get worse from here.

Remote attestation really is killing practical software freedom.

>>c0l0+IH
How could a build be verified to be the same code without some kind of signature? You cant just validate a SHA, that could be faked from a client.

If you want to get a package that is in the Arch core/ repo, doesnt that require a form of attestation?

I just don’t see a slippery slope towards dropping support for unofficial clients, we’re already at the bottom where they are generally and actively rejected for various reasons.

Still, the Android case is admittedly disturbing, it feels a lot more personal to be forced to use certain OS builds; that goes beyond the scope of how I would define a client.

>>reilly+bw1
Where we "already" are is not a state to be anchored on.

>>pishpa+vN1
That’s fair. Its just to say there is a lot of context for client verification in software. Competitive multiplayer gaming has become an arms races of exploits and invasive anti-cheat measures; there is no concept of bring-your-own-client when there is money on the line.

Valve has taken a less heavy-handed approach and let users have more freedom over their client and UI, but they also have a massive bot problem in titles like TF2.

I can’t connect to my work network from a random client, and it will throw flags and eventually block me if I connect with an out-of-date OS version.

I can’t present any piece of paper with my banking data and a signature on it and expect other parties to accept it. I have to present it on an authorized document.

I guess money may be the common denominator here.