zlacker

[return to "I read the federal government’s Zero-Trust Memo so you don’t have to"]
1. static+ua[view] [source] 2022-01-27 15:56:56
>>EthanH+(OP)
This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

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2. codema+cr1[view] [source] 2022-01-27 21:25:07
>>static+ua
Google does 1, 2, and 3 internally. If you join https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/ you can get something similar for personal public accounts.
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3. within+uY1[view] [source] 2022-01-28 00:17:19
>>codema+cr1
I prefer to keep my email as dumbly secured as possible. I’ll never forget this one time I was on my sailboat with no cell service and only an open WiFi connection from shore. I couldn’t login to anything via sms auth. Same thing with FIDO keys when traveling. Lost luggage? No logging in for you until you get home to get your backup? Cut your finger while cooking? No logging in for you! Have to wear a face mask? No logging in for you!

To be clear, I don’t have a better solution. But all the second factor stuff is fundamentally broke when you are likely to need access to the service most.

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