zlacker

>>EthanH+(OP)
This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

>>static+ua
I think 3. is very harmful for actual, real-world use of Free Software. If only specific builds of software that are on a vendor-sanctioned allowlist, governed by the signature of a "trusted" party to grant them entry to said list, can meaningfully access networked services, all those who compile their own artifacts (even from completely identical source code) will be excluded from accessing that remote side/service.

Banks and media corporations are doing it today by requiring a vendor-sanctioned Android build/firmware image, attested and allowlisted by Google's SafetyNet (https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/a...), and it will only get worse from here.

Remote attestation really is killing practical software freedom.

>>c0l0+IH
It depends on the level of attestation required. A simple client certificate should suffice for the majority of the non-DoD applications.

>>regina+EJ
It "should" suffice, but entities like banks and media companies are already going beyond this. As the parent points out, many financial and media apps on Android will just simply not work if the OS build is not signed by a manufacturer on Google's list. Build your own Android ROM (or even use a build of one of the popular alternative ROMs) and you lose access to all those apps.

>>kelnos+g41
I’m not even so sure I’m totally against banks doing that either.

From where I sit right now, I have within arms reach my MacBook, a Win11 Thinkpad, a half a dozen Raspberry Pis (including a 400), 2 iPhones only one of which is rooted, an iPad (unrooted) a Pinebook, a Pine Phone, and 4 Samsung phones one with its stock Android7 EOLed final update and three rooted/jailbroken with various Lineage versions. I have way way more devices running open source OSen than unmolested Apple/Microsoft/Google(+Samsung) provided Software.

My unrooted iPhone is the only one of them I trust to have my banking app/creds on.

I’d be a bit pissed if Netflix took my money but didn’t run where I wanted it, but they might be already, I only ever really use it on my AppleTV and my iPad. I expect I’d be able to use it on my MacBook and thinkpad, but could be disappointed, I’d be a bit surprised if it ran on any of my other devices listed…

>>bigiai+Zv1
Putting a banking app on your pocket surveillance device is one of the least secure things you can do. What happens if you're mugged, forced to login to your account, and then based on your balance it escalates to a kidnapping or class resentment beatdown? Furthermore, what happens if the muggers force you to transfer money and your bank refuses to roll back as unauthorized because their snake oil systems show that everything was "secure" ?