zlacker

>>EthanH+(OP)
This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

>>static+ua
What's wrong with TOTP?

>>pitaj+7G
It's very phishable. Attackers will send text messages to your users saying "Hi, this is Steve with the FooCorp Security Team; we're sorry for the inconvenience, but we're verifying everyone's authentication. Can you please reply with the code on your phone?"

It's even worse with texted codes because it's inherently credible in the moment because the message knows something you feel it shouldn't --- that you just got a 2FA code. You have to deeply understand how authentication systems work to catch why the message is suspicious.

You can't fix the problem with user education, because interacting with your application is almost always less than 1% of the mental energy your users spend doing their job, and they're simply not going to pay attention.