zlacker

>>feross+(OP)
Just the other day I suggested using a yubikey, and someone linked me to the Titan sidechannel where researchers demonstrated that, with persistent access, and a dozen hours of work, they could break the guarantees of a Titan chip[0]. They said "an attacker will just steal it". The researchers, on the other hand, stressed how very fundamentally difficult this was to pull off due to very limited attack surface.

This is the sort of absolutism that is so pointless.

At the same time, what's equally frustrating to me is defense without a threat model. "We'll randomize this value so it's harder to guess" without asking who's guessing, how often they can guess, how you'll randomize it, how you'll keep it a secret, etc. "Defense in depth" has become a nonsense term.

The use of memory unsafe languages for parsing untrusted input is just wild. I'm glad that I'm working in a time where I can build all of my parsers and attack surface in Rust and just think way, way less about this.

I'll also link this talk[1], for the millionth time. It's Rob Joyce, chief of the NSA's TAO, talking about how to make NSA's TAO's job harder.

[0] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/01/hacke...

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA

>>static+Di
> I'm glad that I'm working in a time where I can build all of my parsers and attack surface in Rust and just think way, way less about this.

I'm beginning to worry that every time Rust is mentioned as a solution for every memory-unsafe operation we're moving towards an irrational exuberance about how much value that safety really has over time. Maybe let's not jump too enthusiastically onto that bandwagon.

>>crater+6q
There's literally zero evidence that a program written in Rust is actually practically safer than one written in C at the same scale. And there won't be any evidence of this for some time because no Rust program is as widely deployed as an equivalent highly used C program.

>>TaupeR+OA
That's not true, actually. There is more than "literally zero" evidence. I don't feel like finding it for you, but at minimum Mozilla has published a case study showing that moving to Rust considerably reduced the memory safety issues they discovered. That's just one example, I believe there are others.

There are likely many other examples of, say, Java not having memory safety issues. Java makes very similar guarantees to Rust, so we can extrapolate, using common sense, that the findings roughly translate.

Common sense is a really powerful tool for these sorts of conversations. "Proof" and "evidence" are complex things, and yet the world goes on with assumptions that turn out to hold quite well.

>>static+eC
Not sure what your last sentence means - without evidence, there are cases when we guess right, and those when we guess wrong. Are you just choosing to ignore the latter?

The Mozilla case study is not a real world study. It simply looks at the types of bugs that existed and says "I promise these wouldn't have existed if we had used Rust". Would Rust have introduced new bugs? Would there be an additional cost to using Rust? We don't know and probably never will. What we care about is preventing real world damage. Does Rust prevent real world damage? We have no idea.