zlacker

>>lxm+(OP)
In an age where newspapers were bought at news stands for cash, identity of the reader was entirely anonymous.

In an age where printed periodicals were delivered by subscription, the subscriber information was available (and yes, often tracked by local and federal law enforcement), but not the specifics of what articles were read.

Today, with Web-based document delivery and Javascript instrumentation, the specifics of who reads what articles, time on page, sections read, interactions, shares, and more, are available not just to the publishere but advertisers, any entities hacking into or accessing their systems, app developers, and more.

And, yes, law enforcement, whether under warrant, subpoena, or ... other methods.

>>dredmo+Lh
The "other methods" is the curious facet of this story to me. With stuff like this [1] [2] I wonder if the FBI really "needs" USA Today to comply to get this information or rather, this is part of a long-term strategy to get legal precedent on their side. The same dynamics were in play with the San Bernardino shooting, where they made a big deal out of getting data they didn't seem to actually need.

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Data_Center

2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A

>>user39+DH
I hadn't considered the precedent angle. That's an interesting one.

I was thinking along the lines that evidence already exists that would provide much the same value as the access logs might, but the access logs would either provide cover for introducing that evidence, or provide the value without disclosing other surveillance methods.

Either of those prospects is troubling.