zlacker

>>wglb+(OP)
Now, for the best, start another terminal window, and switch to root (e.g. using su, or sudo). Notice how the xinput running as user is able to sniff all your keystrokes, including root password (for su), and then all the keystrokes you enter in your root session. Start some GUI app as root, or as different user, again notice how your xinput can sniff all the keystrokes you enter to this other app!

This is not the problem it's made out to be:

1. An application running as a different user can only connect to the X server if it has access to the .Xauthority file. This means there's no risk of having another user connect to your X session and sniff keystrokes, unless you explicitly chmod o+r ~/.Xauthority.

2. One should never run untrusted applications.

Now, I will grant that better GUI process isolation and/or granular X permissions would be useful, in that it would lay the groundwork for a safe way of allowing an untrusted remote (or local) process to display a GUI on the local X screen. I've also always wished window managers would highlight windows from a different user with a red border, mostly so I could tell which file browser window I'd started with sudo.

>>nitrog+43
> One should never run untrusted applications.

Security through omniscience? Is that any kind of answer? This is a whole that can be plugged.