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[return to "Signal app downloads spike as US protesters seek message encryption"]
1. aeroph+Z4[view] [source] 2020-06-05 02:52:17
>>pera+(OP)
Honest question for those in the know: If I wanted to run my own personal “analysis” to verify the security of Signal, where would I start? Is it even possible? Just curious if there was a way to “know” rather than “trust”.
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2. raspyb+d5[view] [source] 2020-06-05 02:53:44
>>aeroph+Z4
Learn cryptography to a high level then read the source code?
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3. drdrey+J5[view] [source] 2020-06-05 02:58:51
>>raspyb+d5
How do you know that the binary you run actually corresponds to the source code you read?

EDIT: and would you then also review every commit to make sure nothing bad gets introduced? No, at some point you have to place trust in the vendor, the developers, independent audits, etc.

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4. ciaran+f6[view] [source] 2020-06-05 03:02:45
>>drdrey+J5
You can build the source locally, then compare the MD5 hash value of your build to (1) the hash value they post publicly for their build and (2) the actual hash value of their build once you download it.

Assuming all three match, you know that the binary matches the source.

Someone who is more technically inclined can probably go into more detail on this.

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5. drdrey+Ya[view] [source] 2020-06-05 03:53:06
>>ciaran+f6
This is actually more involved than it sounds. It is pretty easy for the compiler to introduce nondeterminism and result in slightly different binaries. I know this for a fact because I fixed a couple bugs like this in LLVM.

For the curious: we actually were intentional about finding these, by compiling many programs with the same parameters on different machines. One with a 32 bit OS and toolchain, the other one on a 64 bit machine, and we would get alerted when we produced binaries with a different checksum.

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