Is there doubt as to whether a neuron can be represented computationally?
1. You have to solve the interaction problem (how does the mind interact with the physical world?)
2. You need to explain why the world is not physically closed without blatantly violating physical theory / natural laws.
3. From the fact that the mind is nonphysical, it does not follow that computationalism is false. On the contrary, I'd say that computationalism is still the best explanation of how human thinking works even for a dualist. (All the alternatives are quite mystical, except maybe for hypercomputationalism.)
2. If the world is not physically closed then physical theory and natural laws are not violated, since they would not apply to anything beyond the physical world.
3. True, but if the mind can be shown to perform physically uncomputable tasks, then we can infer the mind is not physical. In which case we can also apply Occam's razor and infer the mind is doing something uncomputable as opposed to having access to vast immaterial computational resources.
Finally, calling a position names, such as 'mystical', does nothing to determine the veracity of the position. At best it is counter productive by distracting from the logic of the argument.
And I don't think we have a completely firm grasp on what is possible computationally with a given amount of physical resources, given the development of quantum computing.