In this case, it doesn't sound like they're reverting it because of overall breakage, but rather because it breaks the tool that would otherwise be used to control TLS 1.3 trials and other configuration. Firefox had a similar issue, where they temporarily used more conservative settings for their updater than for the browser itself, to ensure that people could always obtain updates that might improve the situation.
In the case of a security appliance -- such as this -- it should, in my opinion, "fail closed".
The RFC (which if you're implementing TLS, you should have open at all times) explicitly calls out exactly this behavior:
> Note: some server implementations are known to implement version negotiation incorrectly. For example, there are buggy TLS 1.0 servers that simply close the connection when the client offers a version newer than TLS 1.0.
The quality of this vendor's implementation is extremely suspect.